Research on the Logic of Mobile Governance from the Perspective of Path Dependency: A Case Study of the Implementation of the “Coal-to-Gas” Policy in Rural Areas of Handan

From the perspective of path dependency, the logic of mobile governance can be analyzed in three aspects: conformist path dependency, policy path dependency, and demand path dependency. 5.1. The Logic of Mobile Governance under the Path Dependency of Conformist Under the conformist path dependency, mobile governance in rural areas of Handan is mainly manifested in the “coal-to-gas” policy. In terms of Handan as a whole, using natural gas for heating is more effective and cost-efficient than using electricity for heating. Residents undergoing the “coal-to-gas” transformation incur lower expenses and obtain higher benefits compared to those undergoing the “coal-to-electricity” transformation. However, for certain rural areas in Handan, particularly in the southern mountainous regions where the construction of natural gas stations is challenging, and heat sources are unstable, the more suitable policy is the “coal-to-electricity” transformation for heating facilities electrification. Due to customary path dependency, despite the appropriateness of the “coal-to-electricity” policy for these areas, the rural regions located in mountainous areas followed the trend of “coal-to-gas” transformations adopted in most rural areas throughout the city, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. The underperformance of Handan’s “coal-to-gas” project can be analyzed following the logic presented below. Under the policy pressure from higher authorities, lower-level departments to achieve centralized and unified policy requirements, resorted to using mobile governance to implement relevant policies. Faced with the dual pressures of time and performance, grassroots cadres lacked sufficient time, energy, and resources to consider tailored solutions based on local conditions. Therefore, from the perspective of rational choice by grassroots cadres, adopting commonly used approaches from other regions to promote policy implementation was the most cautious approach. Even if there were implementation deviations, they could avoid responsibility due to the principle that “the law does not hold individuals accountable”. This underscores the policy selection root of conformist path dependency. Conformist path dependency ensures that the policy execution by grassroots cadres follows the mainstream trend. Driven by a mentality of “not seeking merit but avoiding blame”, they may disregard the requirement for practicality and tailored solutions, leading to policy implementation deviations, exacerbating implementation challenges, and causing the public to be more perplexed and unaccepting of the policy’s effectiveness, thus failing to realize the practicality of the policy in practice. 5.2. The Logic of Mobile Governance under the Path Dependency of Policy The policy path dependency in the “coal-to-gas” policy in rural areas of Handan is mainly evident in grassroots governments’ compulsory collection of scattered coal stored in residents’ homes without providing relevant financial compensation, leading to resident dissatisfaction. The collection of scattered coal stored in residents’ homes by grassroots governments is not unfounded or unsupported. In the “Handan Coal-to-Gas Policy Regulations” issued in 2022, it is stipulated that “to advance the effective implementation of the coal-to-gas strategy, residents’ stored coal should be acquired on a principle of equivalence and subsidies discounted for the transformation of natural gas heating equipment in residents’ homes”. However, there are certain policy loopholes regarding the issue of price subsidies after the collection of coal stored in residents’ homes. Due to Handan’s overall adoption of a “three-three system” for the coal-to-gas strategy, where the government subsidizes one-third of the cost, the village collective expends one-third, and farmers contribute one-third, the discounted subsidies after the collection of stored coal are often conflated with government subsidies. Some farmers have a large amount of stored coal, and the calculated amount may exceed the government’s coal-to-gas subsidy by more than double. However, due to existing policy loopholes, it is challenging for the public to receive discounted subsidies for the collected coal. The escalation of the issue originated from the scattered coal collection work in L Village, F Mining Area of Handan. The mining area in Handan is rich in coal resources, with low-priced scattered coal stored by each household. With the gradual implementation of the coal-to-gas policy, the F Mining Area government accelerated the collection of scattered coal. However, due to certain policy loopholes in the coal collection regulations, the related discounted subsidies for scattered coal were consistently incomplete, eventually turning into forced collection, leading to several instances of forcibly confiscating residents’ scattered coal storage and even violent coal collection. The violent collection of scattered coal sparked strong discontent among the populace. Coupled with the fact that the heating effects in the first winter of the coal-to-gas policy did not meet expectations, far below the previous coal-burning heating efficiency, the residents became increasingly dissatisfied with the “Coal-to-Gas” policy, significantly impeding the advancement of related coal-to-gas policies. The strong discontent among the population triggered by the scattered coal collection in L Village can be analyzed using the following logic. In cases where there are certain policy loopholes in higher-level policy regulations, actions such as collecting scattered coal, which offers some profitability, may be exploited by unscrupulous leadership for personal gain. By utilizing policy-induced path dependency and using the existing policy loopholes in higher-level regulations as a cover, corrupt officials have been able to profit from the difference in coal collections. Some individuals involved in the downfall of the F Mining Area leadership in 2023 confirmed the embezzlement of funds related to the conversion of scattered coal. The sustainability of policy-induced path dependency arises from the pressure on higher-level governments to swiftly implement policies, allowing minor non-compliant actions by grassroots governments to be masked under the guise of policy implementation, becoming an excuse for local governments to address compliance inspections by higher-level authorities. However, the accumulation of such non-compliant actions has further exacerbated conflicts and significantly hindered the effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level. 5.3. The Logic of Mobile Governance under the Path Dependency of Demand Behind demand-driven path dependency, there are mainly two logical chains: seeking credit and avoiding responsibility. These correspond to different political attitudes. When the “coal-to-gas” policy belongs to the “direct competition” category of mobile tasks or the “championship” category of competitive tasks, the speed of progress in the “coal-to-gas” project can serve as a way for local officials to seek credit from higher-level departments. However, when higher-level departments vigorously promote the “coal-to-gas” project due to environmental pressure, the “coal-to-gas” project shifts from being a mobile or competitive task to a daily or restrictive task. The change in the “coal-to-gas” project’s “political positioning” determines which logical chain local governments choose. In comparison, the seeking credit logical chain emphasizes achieving outstanding results, which is the root cause of many showcase projects. The avoiding responsibility logical chain focuses on promoting the policy comprehensively and with no loopholes, thus forming the root of movement-based grassroots governance logic. The avoiding responsibility logical chain, due to its more thorough policy execution, may trigger more contradictions between public opinion and policy execution. Both the seeking credit and avoiding responsibility logical chains reflect the psychological aspect of demand-driven path dependency. Regardless of whether they are seeking credit or avoiding responsibility, they both reflect the need for grassroots officials to achieve political performance and retain their positions. The political mindset of seeking credit and avoiding responsibility in public policy execution reflects the dependency on demand-driven paths. The logical chain of mobile governance under the lens of path dependency can be summarized through the following process: pressure from superior tasks → allocation of attention by lower-level governments → path dependency transmitting the pressure of superior tasks to the grassroots → mobile governance of grassroots governments pushing relevant tasks downward step by step → completion of the goals of seeking credit or avoiding responsibility for lower-level governments. The factors that lead to the generation of mobile governance under the perspective of path dependency are primarily due to the problem of income distribution and governance power mismatch in grassroots governance in China. The current income distribution models in China, whether “inverted T-shaped”, “pyramid-shaped”, or “inverted gourd-shaped”, exhibit a scenario where the number of middle-low-income earners is higher compared to middle-high-income earners. The governance structure in China is characterized by a “thick middle, sharp top and bottom”. This creates a structural mismatch, with more individuals in the middle-low-income group having weaker governance power while fewer individuals in the middle-high-income group have more concentrated governance power. This uneven distribution of governance power is also present across regions and industries. This structural mismatch leads to challenges in policy execution, such as “high-level urgency, grassroots fatigue, middle-level resentment”. When high-level authorities identify deviations in policy execution, policy distortions, formalism, and bureaucratism, they naturally feel the urge to enforce the policy. However, due to the pressure and burden caused by the vertically structured tasks and responsibilities, grassroots officials face challenges in executing the policies properly. Middle-level officials may feel resentful, even if they believe they have made every effort. They may criticize the policy for being overly rational, believing that mobile governance is insufficient to solve the problems. As a result, they may blame subordinates for inadequate execution or improper personnel selection. Some may have the intent but lack the capability to act due to personal limitations, while others might have the ability but lack the intention when personal interests override public interests. Sometimes, when influential governing officials depart, there may be a new round of demolition and reconstruction. Therefore, the issues at the middle level are influenced by various factors, including incomplete governance resources and capabilities; inadequate policy implementation; poor communication; lack of warmth in policy execution; a rigid hierarchical system unable to adapt to the socioeconomic conditions of modern society; a need to improve existing incentive and promotion mechanisms such as the “championship system;” a requirement for further improvements in the rule of law; a relatively limited range of grassroots information sources; traditional ‘official-centric’ and ‘self-serving’ ideologies; and the personal conduct of governing officials. Policy formulation and execution should be based on a view of human nature, as individuals are inherently prone to selfish motivations in any system. The focus of issues under the perspective of path dependency in mobile governance is not on the efficiency of transmitting administrative commands but rather on how effectively the state and society can interact to achieve public satisfaction and social welfare. Moreover, the incompleteness of structural reasons, such as administrative system constraints and imbalanced incentives, often leads to ineffective governance. due to mismatches between administration and society or misunderstandings between administration and social forces. The struggle to reconcile these interactive processes often results in a crisis of mutual trust. Traditional research tends to focus on structural reasons such as administrative system constraints and incentive imbalances, for example, structural contradictions in the “blocks”. The “coincidence of responsibilities” between the superior and lower-level governments arising from the alignment of responsibilities from the top-down configuration causes the system to have challenges in achieving societal governance. Key focus areas at this level are issues such as linear resource dependency, management control distortions, and imbalances in incentive structures. Linear resource dependency primarily involves the pressure exerted from the top-down within the system, serving as an important channel for achieving internal performance within the system. Under a pressure-driven system, local governments at the bottom are directly targeted. They are loaded with many public affairs stemming from administrative extensions. The top-down demands and the functional settings often lead to a unidirectional approach, with upper-level governments unilaterally directing work without achieving genuine social governance. Management control distortions mainly refer to the inevitability of deviations in public policy execution. The consequences of these deviations manifest in the replacement of policy goals or practical work adaptations based on the needs of local governments regarding their rights and interests. This results in management control distortions where local government bodies bypass the intended policy goals or impose strict requirements through a ‘one-size-fits-all’ or misinterpretation approach. The imbalance in incentive structures primarily stems from multiple reforms in the administrative system addressing the “last mile” problem caused by the fragmentation of tasks among different administrative units. Consequently, a series of measures, such as territorial management and accountability, have been introduced. Project management, listing, leadership groups, and mobile governance play vital roles in this issue. Over time, grassroots governance has formed two very distinct governance approaches: “baseline thinking’ and “attention allocation thinking”. Baseline thinking is closely related to the negative list of accountability items, focusing on preventing significant disasters in the jurisdiction. The core essence of this approach is stability, where governance methods aim for simplified approaches to accident prevention. Attention allocation thinking, on the other hand, is influenced by the level of focus from senior leadership on specific matters, which determines the resources and efforts allocated by lower-level governments. In practice, when senior leadership directs a task, grassroots workers tend to prioritize that task over others temporarily. When middle-level officials focus more on how to address inspections and performance evaluations from superior organization, they tend to overlook the importance of catering to the needs of grassroots residents. This can harm the interests of some grassroots residents in fulfilling tasks delegated from higher levels. The resulting issues are perhaps the most dissatisfactory aspect for grassroots residents in the domain of state governance, touching upon the most painful points concerning their interests and representing a significant factor in why the public perceives society as unjust. Measures such as territorial management and accountability were originally intended to assess the extent of policy implementation at the middle level. However, loosening supervision can lead to operational challenges in policy execution, while heightened supervision may result in a cascading effect of increased demands. A situation where poor outcomes outweigh the benefits. The problematic cycle of “one intervention leads to failure, failure leads to retraction, retraction leads to chaos, chaos leads to suppress”, ultimately results in the detriment of public interests. The emergence of the “supervisory paradox” here highlights that neither extreme—under supervision or over-supervision—is effective. Many of the challenges stem from the darker side of human nature. Therefore, policy formulation and execution should account for this aspect of human nature. Most people exhibit a blend of “social beings” and “economic beings”, with individuals reflecting their social side when regulations and constraints are present. When supervision lags behind and human nature’s “evil” side emerges, individuals may act as “rational economic beings”, prioritizing personal interests over communal and societal well-being. This aspect of human nature is subjective and cannot be altered externally, irrespective of the system, institution, or model in place. However, apart from these subjective factors, there is a potential to enhance policy execution through an objective approach and explore a new form of supervision that considers the perspective of those affected by policies. This approach will allow policymakers and implementers to relate more to those impacted by policies, reducing the prevalence of issues stemming from various forms of governance dependency, such as conformist, policy-induced, and demand-driven governance under mobile governance occurrences in the path dependency perspective.